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FUENTES, Circuit Judge. 
 Petitioner Joseph Brown filed three appeals challenging 
the District Court’s denials of his motions to proceed in forma 
pauperis (“IFP”).  He then moved to proceed IFP on appeal, 
and we consolidated his cases for our review.  Under the Prison 
Litigation Reform Act (“Act”), a federal prisoner may proceed 
IFP and file a case without prepaying the requisite fees if the 
prisoner meets certain requirements, including filing an 
affidavit that demonstrates that he cannot afford the fees.1  
However, under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g), the Act’s so-called 
“three strikes rule,” a prisoner cannot proceed IFP if he has “on 
3 or more prior occasions, while incarcerated or detained in any 
facility, brought an action . . . that was dismissed on the 
grounds that it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim 
upon which relief may be granted.”2 
  
 Brown has previously filed three cases in federal district 
courts in California that can potentially be counted as strikes 
under § 1915(g).  Because we conclude that we must use our 
precedent to evaluate whether prior cases are strikes, rather 
than that of the Circuit from which the potential strikes 
emanated, we conclude that Brown has not previously accrued 
three strikes.  Accordingly, we will grant his motions to 
proceed IFP.  We will also reverse the District Court’s denials 
of Brown’s motions and remand the cases for further 
proceedings.  
  
                                                 
1 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). 
2 Id.  at § 1915(g). 
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 Brown is a federal prisoner who filed three separate Bivens 
actions alleging that his Fifth and Eighth Amendment rights had 
been violated by prison employees. 
 
First, on August 4, 2014, Brown filed his complaint in 
Brown v. Kemmerer,3 in which he alleged that various prison 
officials had physically injured him by placing him in 
restraints.  On the same day, Brown also filed a motion to 
proceed IFP.  He indicated on his IFP application that he had 
not previously accrued three strikes.  The District Court 
construed Brown’s motion as a “motion to proceed without full 
prepayment of fees and costs” and granted it.  
   
 On December 15, 2016, while Kemmerer was 
proceeding, Brown filed his complaint in Brown v. Sage,4 in 
which he claimed that he was physically injured because prison 
employees, including his psychologists, were deliberately 
indifferent to his serious mental health issues.  As in 
Kemmerer, on the day he filed his complaint, Brown also filed 
a motion in Sage to proceed without prepayment of fees or 
costs.  The very next day, however, Brown filed a correction to 
his motion, explaining that after he filed it, he received mail 
informing him that he had accrued three strikes.  Accordingly, 
he also explained that he would invoke § 1915(g)’s “imminent 
danger” exception to the three strike rule because of his “very 
likely risk of suffering another traumatic incident as a result of 
suffering from a chronic condition of post[-]traumatic stress 
disorder.”5  The District Court then directed Brown to either 
pay the filing fees or file a motion to proceed IFP, so Brown 
filed such motion. 
                                                 
3 D.C. No. 1:14-cv-01520. 
4 D.C. No. 1:16-cv-02477.  
5 Id. 126. 
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 On January 3, 2017, the District Court filed a 
memorandum opinion in Sage denying Brown’s motion to 
proceed IFP because he had previously accrued three strikes. 
Specifically, the District Court concluded that Brown’s strikes 
emanated from three cases in federal district courts in 
California:  
 
1. Brown v. United States, No. 1:11-CV-01562-
MJS, 2013 WL 2421777 (E.D. Cal. June 3, 2013) 
(“Brown I”); 
2. Brown v. United States, No. 1:12-CV-00165-
AWI-GSA (E.D. Cal. Nov. 13, 2014) (“Brown 
II”); and 
3. Brown v. Profitt, No. 5:13-CV-02338-UA-RZ 
(C.D. Cal. Mar. 7, 2014). 
 
 The District Court also concluded that “Brown’s 
allegations d[id] not satisfy the threshold criterion of the 
imminent danger exception.”6  Accordingly, the District Court 
denied Brown’s application to proceed IFP and dismissed his 
complaint without prejudice.  Brown appealed shortly 
thereafter.  
 
On the same day that the District Court filed its opinion 
in Sage, January 3, 2017, it also filed a memorandum opinion 
in Kemmerer vacating its previous decision to allow Brown to 
proceed without full prepayment of fees and costs and denying 
Brown’s IFP motion.  The District Court explained that it had 
recently come to its attention that Brown had accrued the 
strikes enumerated above, and it concluded that it would 
                                                 
6 J.A. 11. 
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dismiss Brown’s complaint unless he paid the necessary fees.  
Brown later appealed. 
 
  The day after the District Court filed its opinions in Sage 
and Kemmerer, January 4, 2017, Brown filed Brown v. Dees,7 
his third Bivens action.  In Dees, Brown claimed that prison 
physician assistant Sarah Dees denied him treatment for 
second-degree burns after he accidentally spilled hot water on 
himself.  He filed a motion to proceed IFP, in which he 
indicated that he had accrued three strikes but claimed that he 
satisfied § 1915(g)’s imminent danger exception because Dees 
had “deliberately refused [him] medical treatment for serious 
medical needs.”8  On March 24, 2017, the District Court once 
again filed an opinion explaining that Brown had previously 
accumulated three strikes and that he did not meet the 
imminent danger exception. It therefore denied Brown’s IFP 
motion and dismissed the case.   Brown appealed. 
 
 Brown filed motions to proceed IFP in his appeals in 
Sage, Kemmerer and Dees. His motions were consolidated for 
our review, and we appointed pro bono counsel to represent 
Brown.9 
I.  
  
                                                 
7 D.C. No. 1:17-cv-00025 
8 J.A. 143. 
9 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.  
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  “We exercise 
plenary review with respect to the proper interpretation of the 
[Act] and its three strikes rule.”  Millhouse v. Heath, 866 F.3d 
152, 156 (3d Cir. 2017) (citation omitted). 
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 To evaluate a petitioner’s motion to proceed IFP on 
appeal, we generally follow a two-step process.  First, we look 
to § 1915(a) of the Act and “determine[] whether the 
[petitioner] is financially eligible to proceed without 
prepayment of fees.”10  Second, we analyze whether the appeal 
is frivolous.11  In deciding whether to grant a petitioner’s IFP 
motion, we must also consider § 1915(g) of the Act—the three 
strikes rule. Specifically, § 1915(g) provides: 
 
In no event shall a prisoner bring a civil action or 
appeal a judgment in a civil action or proceeding 
[in forma pauperis] if the prisoner has, on 3 or 
more prior occasions, while incarcerated or 
detained in any facility, brought an action or 
appeal in a court of the United States that was 
dismissed on the grounds that it is frivolous, 
malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which 
relief may be granted, unless the prisoner is 
under imminent danger of serious physical 
injury.12 
 
In this case, because the parties do not dispute that 
Brown is financially eligible to proceed IFP and because his 
appeals are not frivolous, our decision on Brown’s IFP motions 
will turn on whether he has previously accrued three strikes.  
As the District Court correctly noted, there are three cases that 
                                                 
10 Urrutia v. Harrisburg Cty. Police Dep’t, 91 F.3d 451, 455 
n.4 (3d Cir. 1996).  
11 Id.; Roman v. Jeffes, 904 F.2d 192, 194 n.1 (3d Cir. 1990); 
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e). 
12 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). 
 
9 
 
we could potentially conclude constitute strikes under § 
1915(g): Brown I, Brown II, and Profitt.13 
  
Because all three of Brown’s prior cases were filed in 
the Eastern and Central Districts of California, we must begin 
our analysis by deciding whether to use our precedent or the 
Ninth Circuit’s to determine whether the dismissals in Brown 
I, Brown II, and Profitt qualify as strikes.  This determination 
is significant because, as will be discussed below, the outcome 
of Brown’s IFP motions turns on which Circuit’s law applies. 
 
Although we have not previously addressed this issue, 
we now conclude that courts in our Circuit should use our 
precedent to evaluate whether prior cases qualify as strikes 
under § 1915(g), regardless of the court from which they 
originated.  As we have often explained, panels of our Court 
are bound by the precedent of prior panels,14 as are the district 
courts in our Circuit.15  We see no reason to depart from this 
                                                 
13 It is worth noting that neither party argues that there are cases 
aside from the three discussed by the District Court that could 
also be considered strikes.  We, too, are unaware of any other 
cases that should be analyzed.  
14 See, e.g., Hassen v. Gov’t of Virgin Islands, 861 F.3d 108, 
114 n.5 (3d Cir. 2017) (“[A] panel of this court is bound to 
follow the holdings of published opinions of prior panels of 
this court.” (quoting Nationwide Ins. v. Patterson, 953 F.2d 44, 
26 (3d Cir. 1991))); U.S. v. Franz, 772 F.3d 134, 144 n.8 (3d 
Cir. 2014) (“[S]itting as a panel of this Court, we cannot 
overrule prior precedent.”). 
15 See, e.g., Valspar Corp. v. E.I. Du Pont Nemours and Co., 
873 F.3d 185, 203 (3d Cir. 2017) (explaining that the District 
Court was bound by Third Circuit precedent). 
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general rule in this situation, nor have the parties provided us 
with one.16  Additionally, we have not found any other Circuit 
that has declined to follow its own precedent when considering 
potential strikes from another Circuit.17  In fact, we believe that 
choosing to follow our own precedent, no matter where the 
potential strike occurred, promotes uniformity and efficiency 
within our Circuit.  Specifically, it ensures that petitioners in 
identical circumstances are treated identically with respect to 
their motions to proceed IFP regardless of where they have 
filed past cases, and it obviates the need for us to ascertain what 
constitutes a strike in every other Circuit.  
We recognize that using our own precedent to 
determine whether a prior dismissal qualifies as a strike may at 
times cause us to conclude that certain dismissals are not 
strikes, even if they were intended as strikes by other courts.  
However, although not ideal, this eventuality is not significant 
                                                 
16 Instead, the parties seemed to agree at oral argument that we 
should apply our own law in this case.  Prior to oral argument, 
we specifically asked the parties to be prepared to discuss 
which Circuit’s law should be applied.  Ultimately, however, 
neither party argued that we should look to the Ninth Circuit’s 
law.    
17 Although they have not explicitly addressed the issue, other 
Circuits have applied their own law when dealing with strikes 
from other courts.  See, e.g., Hafed v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 
635 F.3d 1172, 1177-80 (10th Cir. 2011) (using Tenth Circuit 
precedent to determine whether cases from courts in the 
Seventh Circuit were strikes); Thompson v. Drug Enforcement 
Admin., 492 F.3d 428, 431-40 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (considering 
cases from courts in the Eighth and Eleventh Circuits without 
discussing the precedents of those Circuits). 
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enough to convince us to abandon the long-standing principle 
that we are bound to follow the precedent of our Court. 
 
II.  
 
Having established that we will follow our case law to 
determine strikes under § 1915(g), we now turn to determining 
whether Brown has accrued three strikes.  To begin, as 
Brown’s counsel has conceded, we conclude that Brown I and 
Brown II constitute strikes.18  In Byrd v. Shannon, we 
addressed the standard we should use to evaluate whether a 
dismissal of a filed complaint counts as a strike for IFP 
purposes.19  We explained that “a strike under § 1915(g) will 
accrue only if the entire action or appeal is (1) dismissed 
explicitly because it is ‘frivolous,’ ‘malicious,’ or ‘fails to state 
a claim’ or (2) dismissed pursuant to a statutory provision or 
rule that is limited solely to dismissals for such reasons.”20  
Since Byrd, we have also explained that a dismissal “does not 
rise to the level of a strike” unless it is a dismissal with 
prejudice.21 
 
Brown I and Brown II both meet all of our requirements 
for strikes.  In Brown I, Brown filed a complaint and a series 
of amended complaints against employees at various prisons, 
                                                 
18 At oral argument, Brown’s counsel explicitly conceded that 
Brown I and Brown II qualify as strikes.  In addition, Brown 
did not argue in his briefs that Brown I and Brown II are not 
strikes.  Instead, he focused his argument on whether Profitt is 
a strike. 
19 715 F.3d 117, 124 (3d Cir. 2013). 
20 Id. at 126.  
21 Millhouse, 866 F.3d at 161. 
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alleging that they had failed to diagnose and treat mental 
injuries caused by his post-traumatic stress disorder. 22  
Ultimately, the District Court in the Eastern District of 
California explicitly dismissed Brown’s entire action for 
“failure to state a claim.”23  Its dismissal was with prejudice.24  
Similarly, in Brown II, Brown, proceeding IFP,25 filed a Bivens 
action against prison officials, which the District Court in the 
Eastern District of California dismissed with prejudice for 
“failure to state a Bivens claim upon which relief may be 
granted.”26  Accordingly, we conclude that both Brown I and 
Brown II qualify as strikes under § 1915(g).  
 
Given that Brown has two strikes from Brown I and 
Brown II, our decision on his IFP motions hinges on whether 
Profitt constitutes a third strike.  We conclude that it does not.  
In Profitt, Brown filed a request to proceed without prepaying 
the filing fees to which he attached a complaint. The Central 
District of California noted that the complaint was “lodged” 
and was “sought to be filed” by Brown.27  Ultimately, the 
District Court denied Brown’s request to proceed without 
prepayment of fees using a form entitled “Order Re Leave to 
File Action Without Prepayment of Full Filing Fee,” which 
was signed by both the Magistrate Judge and the District Judge.  
                                                 
22 Brown v. United States, No. 1:11-CV-01562-MJS, 2013 WL 
2421777, at *1 (E.D. Cal. June 3, 2013).  
23 Id. at *6. 
24 Id. 
25 Brown v. U.S., No. 1:12-CV-00165-AWI-GSA (E.D. Cal. 
Mar. 30, 2012) (order granting motion to proceed IFP). 
26 Brown v. U.S., No. 1:12-CV-00165-AWI-GSA, slip op. at 2 
(E.D. Cal. Nov. 13, 2014).  
27 Id. 61. 
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On the form, the Magistrate Judge briefly explained Brown’s 
claim and then stated that Brown had “failed to state a valid 
claim in two attempts.  This matter will be closed.”28  
Additionally, the Magistrate Judge checked boxes indicating 
that Brown’s application was being denied because of “failure 
to state a claim,” that “[l]eave to amend would be futile,” and 
that the denial might constitute a strike for the purposes of § 
1915(g).29  Thus, the matter was closed, and Brown’s 
complaint was never actually filed with the District Court.  
 
As § 1915(g) explains, a prisoner cannot procced IFP 
“if the prisoner has, on 3 or more prior occasions, while 
incarcerated or detained in any facility, brought an action or 
appeal” that was dismissed because it was malicious or 
frivolous or because it failed to state a claim.30  We know then 
that in order for a dismissal to qualify as a strike, the action 
must have been “brought.”  Accordingly, the question we must 
answer is whether Profitt was an action that was “brought” 
even though Brown’s complaint was never filed.  
 
In Gibbs v. Ryan, we clarified that “[i]n the context of 
filing a civil action, ‘bring’ ordinarily refers to the ‘initiation 
of legal proceedings in a suit.’”31  We therefore equated a 
complaint being filed with an action being brought, explaining 
that “[Gibbs’] complaint was filed, and his action was 
                                                 
28 Id. 
29 Id. 
30 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) (emphasis added).  
31 160 F.3d 160, 162 (3d Cir. 1998) (citing Black’s Law 
Dictionary 192 (6th ed. 1990)).  
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‘brought’ when his motion to proceed in forma pauperis was 
granted.”32   
 
We have continuously followed this principle, and we 
reiterate it now.33  In order for an action to be “brought” under 
§ 1915(g), a litigant’s complaint must be filed with the District 
Court.  A complaint, however, cannot be filed until the litigant 
has paid the filing fees or until his motion to proceed IFP has 
been granted.  Thus, because Brown’s complaint in Profitt was 
never filed, we conclude that Profitt was not an action that was 
“brought” under § 1915(g), so it does not constitute a strike.  
 
We recognize that our conclusion would change if we 
applied the Ninth Circuit’s precedent instead of our own.  In 
O’Neal v. Price, the Ninth Circuit “conclude[d] that a plaintiff 
has ‘brought’ an action for the purposes of § 1915(g) when he 
submits a complaint and request to proceed [IFP] to the 
court.”34  Under such rule, Profitt would be an action that was 
“brought” because Brown submitted both a complaint and a 
request to proceed without prepayment of fees to the District 
Court.  Given that fact, and the fact that the District Court’s 
form stated that the case was being dismissed for “failure to 
state a claim,” it seems likely that the District Court intended 
                                                 
32 Id. 
33 See, e.g., Millhouse, 866 F.3d at 158–59 (“[W]e have 
indicated that, when a litigant submits a complaint with an IFP 
motion, the complaint is duly filed after the motion to proceed 
IFP is granted.”); Urrutia, 91 F.3d at 458 n.13 (“[S]ubmitting 
an in forma pauperis complaint to the clerk does not result in 
commencement of the litigation.”). 
 
34 531 F.3d 1146, 1152 (9th Cir. 2008). 
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Profitt to be a strike.  This does not change our analysis, 
however.  As discussed above, we are bound to follow our 
precedent, which dictates that Profitt does not qualify as a 
strike.35  
 
Because we conclude that Brown has not previously 
accrued three strikes under § 1915(g), we will grant his 
motions to proceed IFP on appeal.  
 
III.  
 
Before we turn to the merits of Brown’s appeals, we will 
take this opportunity to clarify the procedure that district courts 
in our Circuit should use to docket a petitioner’s IFP motion 
and complaint.  Specifically, when a district court receives a 
complaint before a petitioner’s motion to proceed IFP has been 
granted, the court should indicate on the docket that the 
complaint has been “lodged.”  Then, if the district court grants 
the petitioner’s IFP motion, it should update the docket with a 
new entry that indicates that the complaint is “filed.” If the 
district court denies the petitioner’s IFP motion, the complaint 
should remain “lodged” until the petitioner pays the filing fees.  
We believe that this procedure best comports not only with the 
statutory text of § 1915, but also with our precedent 
                                                 
35 Although counsel for the appellees tried to assert at oral 
argument that we had adopted the conclusion from O’Neal, 
that is not the case.  While we have discussed O’Neal’s 
holding, we have never stated that we would follow it 
ourselves.  To the contrary, our precedent directly contradicts 
the Ninth Circuit’s policy in O’Neal. See Millhouse, 866 F.3d 
at 158-160 (discussing our rule and O’Neal). 
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demonstrating that a complaint cannot be filed until a 
petitioner’s motion to proceed IFP is granted. 
  
IV.  
 
Finally, we will consider the merits of Brown’s three 
appeals.  In each case, Brown argues that the District Court 
improperly denied his motions to proceed IFP.  He is correct.  
 
To begin, we note that the Government has conceded 
that Brown did not have three strikes at the time the District 
Court first considered his motion to proceed IFP in 
Kemmerer.36  Specifically, the Government explains that the 
District Court granted Brown’s motion (and therefore should 
have officially filed his complaint) in August 2014, but Brown 
II was not dismissed until November 13, 2014.  The District 
Court then concluded that Brown II was a strike when it 
vacated its grant of Brown’s IFP motion in January 2017.  
Although we have not previously pinpointed the time at which 
a district court may no longer consider new dismissals to be 
strikes, we have addressed the issue in the appellate context.  
In Millhouse v. Heath, we explained that we must “look to the 
date the notice of appeal is filed in assessing whether a 
dismissal counts as a strike.  Strikes accrued after this date 
simply do not count under § 1915(g).”37 
We now extend the Millhouse rule to encompass the 
situation before us here.  We conclude that strikes that accrue 
before the filing of a complaint count under § 1915(g), while 
strikes that accrue after do not.  We believe that this rule makes 
sense given the language of § 1915(g) itself. Section 1915(g) 
                                                 
36 Appellees’ Br. 22. 
37 Millhouse, 866 F.3d at 161. 
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explicitly states that “[i]n no event shall a prisoner bring a civil 
action” if he has previously accrued three strikes.38  This 
language makes clear that the critical point from which we 
must determine a petitioner’s number of strikes is when the 
action is brought—meaning, as we have clarified, when the 
complaint is filed.  In other words, because we have equated 
“bring” with “file a complaint,” § 1915(g) can be read to state 
that “[i]n no event shall a prisoner [file a complaint in] a civil 
action” if he has previously accrued three strikes. 
  
Accounting for the rule that only strikes that accrue 
before the filing of a complaint count under § 1915(g), we 
agree with the Government that Brown II did not qualify as a 
strike when the District Court vacated its grant of Brown’s IFP 
motion in Kemmerer in January 2017.  As discussed above, 
Brown’s complaint was filed well before Brown II was 
dismissed. Accordingly, when the District Court reconsidered 
Brown’s motion, Brown had only accrued one strike—Brown 
I.  Thus, we will reverse the District Court’s denial of Brown’s 
IFP motion and remand Kemmerer for further proceedings.  
 
We will also reverse the District Court’s denials of 
Brown’s motions in Sage and Dees.  As set forth, the District 
Court denied Brown’s motions because it concluded that he 
had accrued three prior strikes in Brown I, Brown II and Profitt.  
However, as we have explained, Brown has not accrued three 
strikes because Profitt does not qualify as one.  We will 
therefore reverse the District Court and remand the cases.39 
                                                 
38 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) (emphasis added).  
39 Because we reverse the District Court’s denials based on the 
number of strikes Brown has accrued, we need not discuss any 
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V.  
 
For the foregoing reasons, we will grant Brown’s 
motions to proceed IFP on appeal. We will also reverse the 
District Court’s denials of Brown’s IFP motions and remand 
all three of Brown’s cases for further proceedings.  
                                                 
of Brown’s arguments regarding the Act’s imminent danger 
exception. 
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Brown v. Sage 
Nos. 17-1222, 17-1527, 17-1714 
 
CHAGARES, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting 
in part. 
 
 My learned colleagues have applied the law of this 
Court, but that jurisprudence was superseded by statute over 
twenty years ago.  Nevertheless, the majority has extended it, 
thereby creating a circuit split, mandating adherence to an 
inflexible rule that many courts in this circuit have abandoned, 
and increasing litigation (and confusion) over what constitutes 
a “strike” for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).  I write 
separately because I believe that the Court should take this case 
en banc to align our jurisprudence with the Prison Litigation 
Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321-66 
(1996) (the “PLRA”) and with the decisions of our sister 
Courts of Appeals.  Adherence to our outdated and rigid two-
step procedure — the prism through which courts in this circuit 
must now divine whether prior dismissals that occurred both in 
and out of this circuit constitute strikes — should be discarded 
in favor of the flexible and discretionary approach required by 
the PLRA. 
 
 Whether Brown’s complaint and IFP application sent to 
the District Court are categorized as filed, brought, or lodged 
is somewhat beside the point to a proper analysis under the 
PLRA.  That is because the PLRA amended 28 U.S.C. § 1915 
in 1996 to provide, inter alia: 
 
Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, 
that may have been paid, the court shall dismiss the 
case at any time if the court determines  
2 
 
 that— 
 (A) the allegation of poverty is untrue, or 
 (B) the action or appeal— 
  (i) is frivolous or malicious;  
  (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief  
  may be granted; or  
  (iii) seeks monetary relief against a  
  defendant who is immune from such relief. 
  
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2).  So, under this section, a district court 
is authorized to dismiss a case “at any time,” regardless of the 
status of a filing fee.  
  
 Our jurisprudence incorrectly, in my view, requires a 
rigid two-step process.  The first step is focused upon the 
resolution of the IFP application.  A complaint sent to the court 
“cannot be filed until the litigant has paid the filing fees or until 
his motion to proceed IFP has been granted.”  Maj. Op. 14.  
Only after a complaint is filed may the court perform its 
screening duty, employing the criteria set forth in § 1915(e)(2).  
See Maj. Op. 8.  The majority applies our jurisprudence to hold 
that because the Proffitt court in California simultaneously 
denied Brown’s IFP motion and dismissed his complaint as 
frivolous, the case was never filed and, thus, could not be 
considered a “strike” under § 1915(g). 
 
 Our jurisprudence and holding are at odds with the 
temporal freedom mandated by § 1915(e)(2).  Section 
1915(e)(2) permits a court to dismiss a case 
“[n]otwithstanding” the filing fee matters that we consider in 
our step one analysis.  Moreover, we disregard the PLRA’s 
grant of authority that a court may dismiss a case “at any time.”  
3 
 
Under the Court’s view, “at any time” is limited to a time after 
the filing fee matters are resolved.  
    
 An analysis of our prior caselaw and the purposes of the 
PLRA assist in explaining my position.  Under the pre-1996 
version of 28 U.S.C. § 1915, our two-step process when 
proceeding in cases with an IFP motion was as follows:  “the 
“court grant[ed] or denie[d] in forma pauperis status based on 
economic criteria alone and then, if warranted, dismisse[d] the 
[case] as frivolous pursuant to § 1915(d).”  Roman v. Jeffes, 
904 F.2d 192, 194 n.1 (3d Cir. 1990).  Section 1915(d), at that 
time, provided that “[t]he court may . . . dismiss the case if the 
allegation of poverty is untrue, or if satisfied that the action is 
frivolous or malicious.”  28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) (1990). 
 
 Prior to enactment of the PLRA, the federal courts had 
become overwhelmed with prisoner litigation.  Indeed, by 
1995, prisoner lawsuits constituted twenty-five percent of 
federal court filings.  Roller v. Gunn, 107 F.3d 227, 230 (4th 
Cir. 1997).  Congress became deeply concerned that a large 
volume of frivolous and vexatious prisoner lawsuits both 
slowed the judicial process and were unnecessarily costly for 
defendants.  Through its hearing process, Congress learned of 
many colorful instances of such prisoner litigation.  See Nussle 
v. Willette, 224 F.3d 95, 105 (2d Cir. 2000) (quoting 141 Cong. 
Rec. S14413 (daily ed. Sept. 27, 1995) (statement of Sen. 
Abraham) (discussing examples of cases such as ones 
involving an “‘insufficient storage locker space,’ a defective 
haircut by a prison barber, the failure of prison officials to 
invite a prisoner to a pizza party for a departing prison 
employee, and yes, being served chunky peanut butter instead 
of the creamy variety”), rev’d sub nom. Porter v. Nussle, 534 
U.S. 516 (2002).  As a result, a main purpose of the PLRA was 
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“to limit the filing of frivolous and vexatious prisoner lawsuits” 
by “curtail[ing] the ability of prisoners to take advantage of the 
privilege of filing I.F.P.”  Abdul-Akbar v. McKelvie, 239 F.3d 
307, 314 (3d Cir. 2001) (en banc).  Further, the PLRA was 
intended to “preserv[e] resources of both the courts and the 
defendants in prisoner litigation.”  Byrd v. Shannon, 715 F.3d 
117, 125 (3d Cir. 2013).    
    
 One of the important reforms instituted by the PLRA to 
require “early judicial screening of prisoner complaints.”  
Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 202 (2007).  See also 141 Cong. 
Rec. S14414 (daily ed. Sept. 27, 1995) (statement of Sen. Dole) 
(noting that the PLRA “would allow a Federal judge to 
immediately dismiss a complaint”).  Specifically, § 1915(d) 
was re-designated as § 1915(e), the phrase “at any time” was 
added, other bases to dismiss were added, and “may dismiss” 
was changed to “shall dismiss.”  Further, the PLRA added 28 
U.S.C. § 1915A, which requires courts to screen a prisoner 
complaint for possible dismissal “before docketing, if feasible 
or, in any event, as soon as practicable after docketing.”  28 
U.S.C. § 1915A(a).  And, of course, the PLRA added the so-
called “three strikes” rule in 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).  In so doing, 
the PLRA “supplie[s] a powerful economic incentive not to file 
frivolous lawsuits or appeals.”  Abdul-Akbar, 239 F.3d at 314. 
  
 Shortly after enactment of the PLRA, we considered an 
IFP prisoner complaint that a district court dismissed as 
frivolous in Urrutia v. Harrisburg Cty. Police Dep’t, 91 F.3d 
451 (3d Cir. 1996).  The Court determined that it would apply 
the older version of § 1915, as that was the version in effect 
when the complaint was considered by the district court, 
although in dicta, the Court speculated that “[t]here is no 
reason to think that the procedure will be any different under 
5 
 
the new version of § 1915.”  Id. at 455 n.4.  The Court repeated 
its prior two-step process, but it acknowledged:  “More 
commonly, however, both the filing of the complaint and the 
authorization of service of the complaint on the defendants are 
postponed while the magistrate judge and/or district judge 
consider the § 1915(a) (indigency) and (d) (frivolousness) 
issues together.”  Id.  
 
 Notwithstanding this acknowledgment in Urrutia and 
the advent of the PLRA, the Court today expressly forecloses 
the viability of this “common[]” practice in the Third Circuit.  
I note that this Court and the district courts in this circuit have 
routinely taken the approach mandated by the PLRA without 
much fanfare.  See, e.g., Parker v. Montgomery Cty. Corr. 
Facility, 870 F.3d 144, 147 (3d Cir. 2017) (counting as a strike 
a case with an order both granting IFP status and dismissing 
the case and noting the “at any time” language in § 1915(e)(2)); 
Semulka v. Pennsylvania, 515 F. App’x 74, 74 (3d Cir. 2013) 
(per curiam) (granting IFP and dismissing complaint as 
frivolous in same order and noting that the district court did the 
same); Ackerman v. Mental Health Court, No. 2:13-CV-173, 
2013 WL 456384 (W.D. Pa. Feb. 6, 2013) (dismissing the 
complaint as frivolous and denying IFP in same order); 
Jackson v. Brown, No. 11cv0702, 2011 WL 13176162 (W.D. 
Pa. Sept. 19, 2011) (dismissing the complaint and denying IFP 
application as moot in same order); Cannon v. Sleet, No. 09-
793, 2009 WL 4899235 (D. Del. Dec. 11, 2009) (same); 
Salzman v. Bucks Cty. Family Court, No. 07-cv-1682 (E.D. 
Pa. May 3, 2007) (dismissing complaint as frivolous and 
denying IFP in same order); Ajjahnon v. State, No. 06-cv-
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3696, 2006 WL 2465422 (D.N.J. Aug. 22, 2006) (same).1  
Indeed, at oral argument, the Assistant U.S. Attorney 
representing the Government advised the Court that the 
District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania does not 
follow the strict two-step process.    
 
 Our Court should adopt the more flexible analysis 
signaled in Urrutia and mandated by the PLRA.  I believe that 
courts have the discretion to assess the two steps in either order 
or even simultaneously.  See 10 James W. Moore, Moore’s 
Federal Practice § 55.104[1][a] (3d ed. 2018) (noting that “the 
court may dismiss the case, either before ruling on or after 
granting in forma pauperis status”).  Accordingly, as in Proffitt, 
a district court could make “the fee assessment and conduct[] 
the screening process in the same opinion and order.”  McGore 
v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 608 (6th Cir. 1997).  This 
approach best captures the letter and intent for the PLRA.  
Courts would have the ability, then, to screen complaints “at 
                                                            
1 The United States District Court for the Middle District of 
Pennsylvania in Powell v. Hoover, 956 F. Supp. 564 (M.D. Pa. 
1997), addressed the then-new PLRA head-on.  The court 
observed that the PLRA amended § 1915 to include the “at any 
time language.”  Id. at 567.  That language, the court noted, “is 
a reason to think that the procedure will be different under the 
new version of § 1915.”  Id.  In particular, the court posited 
that “‘at any time’ would include a time prior to granting the 
application to proceed in forma pauperis.’”  Id.  The court 
further posited that under the PLRA, whether a filing fee has 
been paid “does not affect the authority of the court to dismiss 
the case.”  Id.  As a result, the court concluded that a court may 
now “review the complaint for merit without ruling on the 
motion to proceed in forma pauperis.”  Id.  
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any time,” § 1915(e)(2), and it would allow fulfillment of the 
mandate of § 1915A to screen complaints “before docketing” 
or as soon practicable thereafter.  This approach would also 
allow courts “avoid [the] pointless paper shuffling,” Ford v. 
Johnson, 362 F.3d 395, 400 (7th Cir. 2004), of the two-step 
method and would empower the courts to move early to screen 
complaints that should be dismissed to conserve judicial 
resources and “conserve the resources of defendants forced to 
respond to baseless lawsuits,” Buchheit v. Green, 705 F.3d 
1157, 1161 (10th Cir. 2012).  This approach would relieve us 
from straining to define the word “bring” in § 1915(g),2 and 
would align us with our sister Courts of Appeals.  See, e.g., 
Buchheit, 705 F.3d at 1160, 1161 (noting that, although not 
                                                            
2 The two Courts of Appeals that have addressed what the 
PLRA means by brought an action have held brought is “when 
a complaint is tendered to the district clerk,” rather than when 
it is filed.  Ford v. Johnson, 362 F.3d 395, 400 (7th Cir. 2004).  
See also O’Neal v. Price, 531 F.3d 1146, 1152 (9th Cir. 2008) 
(“[W]e conclude that a plaintiff has ‘brought’ an action for 
purposes of § 1915(g) when he submits a complaint and 
request to proceed in forma pauperis to the court.”); Vaden v. 
Summerhill, 449 F.3d 1047, 1050 (9th Cir. 2006) (adopting 
holding in Ford).  Today we create a circuit split that I believe 
is unnecessary.  Even if we were compelled to answer this 
question, I believe that the Courts of Appeals for the Seventh 
and Ninth Circuits were correct in their interpretation of 
brought.  In particular, that word “properly focuses attention 
on what the prisoner-plaintiff does” to start his or her lawsuit, 
as opposed to the “filing” a court employee might undertake.  
Vaden, 449 F.3d at 1050.  Further, our jurisprudence simply 
does not supply a ready definition of brought for purposes of 
the PLRA.          
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required, “screening might be a good practice and more 
efficient” before considering an IFP application, and observing 
that “the language of the present rule . . . provides needed 
flexibility”); Torres v. O’Quinn, 612 F.3d 237, 249 (4th Cir. 
2010) (“[I]n keeping with the sensible practice of many district 
courts around the country, the district court in these cases 
promptly determined that the complaints failed to state a claim 
upon which relief could be granted and dismissed each case 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A without bothering to process 
Torres’s request for in forma pauperis status.”), abrogated on 
other grounds by Bruce v. Samuels, 136 S. Ct. 627 (2016); 
O’Neal v. Price, 531 F.3d 1146, 1151-56 (9th Cir. 2008); Ford, 
362 F.3d at 399-400 (“A prisoner’s civil action may be 
dismissed . . .  before any fees have been paid, and thus before 
‘filing’ occurs.”); McGore, 114 F.3d at 608 (noting that the 
court’s two-step process does not prohibit courts from 
simultaneously considering both steps); Leonard v. Lacy, 88 
F.3d 181, 185 (2d Cir. 1996) (observing the various practices 
among the district courts with regard to docketing and 
dismissing of frivolous prisoner IFP actions, which includes 
the simultaneous docketing and dismissal of complaints, and 
“[a]s to such dismissed complaints, the [IFP] motion is granted 
in some courts, and denied in other courts”).3 
                                                            
3 Our decision in Byrd recognized that “the PLRA’s purpose is 
best served by taking an approach that does not open the door 
to more litigation surrounding § 1915(g)” and, in particular, 
“more, and perhaps unnecessary, litigation on whether or not a 
particular dismissal constitutes a strike.”  715 F.3d at 126.  Our 
decision does just that and will require courts in this circuit to 
discern whether potential strikes based on dismissals outside 
this circuit meet our rigid two-step procedural requirements.  
This is so despite our bright-line rule set forth in Byrd that a 
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 For the foregoing reasons, I concur in part and dissent 
in part and urge the Court to consider this matter en banc. 
 
                                                            
strike occurs, inter alia, when an “entire action or appeal is . . . 
dismissed explicitly because it is ‘frivolous,’ ‘malicious,’ or 
fails to state a claim.’”  Id.  See generally Millhouse v. Heath, 
866 F.3d 152, 164 (3d Cir. 2017) (recognizing that “we 
adopted in Byrd a bright-line rule in deciding what constitutes 
a strike.).  The California-based district court’s order in Profitt 
clearly met this bright line rule, and the majority even noted 
the likelihood “that the District Court intended Profitt to be a 
strike.”  Maj. Op. 15.  Nonetheless, Profitt is not considered a 
strike under today’s decision. 
